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Abstract: multimodal biometric systems are capable of utilizing, more than one physiological or behavioral 
characteristic for enrolment either in verification or identification mode, It is generally believed that several 
biometric sources usually compensate for the weaknesses of single biometric fusion techniques. The features that 
extracted from the biometric samples considered a critical part of biometric system which is called biometric 
template it is one of the most crucial issues in designing a secure system. 
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1.	Introduction 
*Biometric field has taken a huge interest by 
global industry with protect and safeguard 
information as an everlasting necessity, Biometric is 
uses to identify authorized person based on specific 
physiological or behavioral features (Rajni, 2014). 
Most biometric systems that are currently in 
operation usually utilize a single biometric trait 
which called unibiometric systems. Other systems 
utilize two or more biometrics traits which called 
Mutlibiometrics systems (Aly et al., 2013) which 
utilize, or are capable of utilizing, more than one 
physiological or behavioral characteristic for 
enrolment either in verification or identification 
mode. It is generally believed that by integrating 
various biometric traits into one single unit, the 
limitations of unibiomatic systems can be alleviate 
(Ross et al., 2006). Given that several biometric 
sources usually compensate for the weaknesses of 
single biometric fusion techniques has dealt 
primarily with the fusion at the score matching level. 
A number of anatomical and behavioral body traits 
can be used for biometric recognition (see Fig. 1). It 
can be divide into two types as below (Shoa'a and 
AbdulAziz, 2011): 
1) Physiological attributes: These attributes 
identify the person on the basis of anatomical traits 
such as face, fingerprint, iris, palm print, DNA, hand 
geometry and ear shape. Biological features are 
strong durable “link” between the person and 
identity and these qualities cannot be easily lost, 
forgotten, shared, or forged. Biological systems 
require the user to be present at the time 
authentication and it can also be used to deter users 
from making false claims disclaimer. For these 
reasons, adopting of biometric systems is increased 
in a number of government and civilian applications.  
                                                 
* Corresponding Author. 
2) Behavioral attributes: based on the analysis of 
the behavior of an individual while he is performing 
a specific task, example gait, signature, keystroke 
dynamics and voice (Griaule Biometrics, 2012). 
Certain characteristics of a person’s voice such as 
pitch, tenor and nasality are due to physical factors 
like vocal tract shape, and other characteristics such 
as word or phoneme pronunciation (e. g., dialect), 
use of characteristic words or phrases and 
conversational styles are mostly learned (Shoa'a and 
AbdulAziz, 2011). There are other characteristics 
called "Ancillary characteristics" such as gender, 
ethnicity, age, eye color, skin color, scars and tattoos 
also provide some information about the identity of 
a person. However, since these ancillary attributes 
do not provide sufficient evidence to precisely 
determine the identity, they are usually referred to 
as soft biometric characteristic (James, 2011).  
 
 
Fig.	2:	Biometrics System Type 
 
Salient features are extracted from biometrics 
using some feature transformation technique and get 
converted into digital form. This digital information 
is stored in the database which is known as 
Biometric Template. Later the template is used 
during authentication purpose, compromised 
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biometric templates are unlike passwords and 
tokens they cannot be revoked and reissued this led 
to become biometric template security is an 
important issue and protecting the template is a 
challenging task due to intra user variability in the 
acquired biometric traits, based on knowledge of the 
biometric characteristics (Malhotra and Dr.Kant, 
2013). 
2.	History	of	biometrics		
The term "biometrics" is derived from the Greek 
words bio (life) and metric (to measure). Among all 
the biometric techniques, fingerprint-based 
identification is the oldest method it has been used 
by the ancient Assyrians, Babylonians, Japanese and 
Chinese for signing certificates. In ancient Babylon, 
fingerprints were used on clay tablets for business. 
The survey of handprints was the only way to 
distinguish an illiterate another because they could 
not write their own name. In the 1870s, an 
anthropologist and the receptionist Police in Paris, 
France, named Alphonse Bertillon tried the problem 
on the basis of his system to the assertion that the 
measurement of adult bone does not resolve to 
change after the age of twenty year old. The method 
was to identify people by. Measurements that the 
height of a person, arm length and the width of the 
head, the length of the individual fingers, the length 
of the forearm, etc. calipers He developed a method 
of multiple measurements of the body, which is 
named after him and is called Bertillon Ages. His 
system has been used worldwide by police, but it 
quickly disappeared when it was discovered that 
some people share the same measures in parts of the 
body (Miller, 1971). In the late 19th century, Francis 
Goldstein wrote a detailed study of fingerprints in 
which he presented a new classification system with 
prints of all ten fingers. After Galton calculations 
were 1 in 64 billion chances of two distinct 
impressions, even. Galton identified characteristics 
of fingerprints which are identified (minutiae) which 
(Goldstein et al., 1970) are essentially the same 
today, still in use. This classification of minutiae is 
often referred to as Galton details. Also in the 1890s, 
police in Bengal, India, under British policeman 
Edward Richard Henry started with fingerprints to 
identify criminals. As an Assistant Commissioner of 
the Metropolitan Police, Henry founded the first 
fingerprint files of the UK in London in 1901 (Chawki 
and Abdel Wahab, 2006). Some of the earliest work 
on face recognition system can be panorama of the 
1960s at a company called Research in Palo Alto, 
California predicted. This type of research is then 
referred to as artificial intelligence, by Woody 
Bledsoe, was a pioneer in the field of automated 
reasoning. His method called "human face 
recognition and machine" using a technique known 
as feature extraction. In 1974 was a year of 
breakthrough for automated biometric data, such as 
hand geometry at the University of Georgia campus 
food service areas to get started. Both Stanford 
Research Institute at the National Physical 
Laboratory in the United States and Britain signed 
detection systems (Chawki and Abdel Wahab, 2006) 
started. In 1985, one of the first scanning systems of 
the retina to secure access to a Department of 
Defense facility at the Naval Postgraduate School 
was used. In the mid-1980s, the State of California 
had been fingerprinting as a requirement for all 
license applications. The first organization of the 
biometric industry, International Biometric 
Association (IBA), founded in 1986-1987.Iris 
recognition technology in the 1980s by John 
Daugman was developed at the University of 
Cambridge. Other new technologies in the 
production of commercially available include 
arcograph face and the face recognition system 
(Chawki and Abdel Wahab, 2006). 1987 River 
develop an algorithm obtained a patent for the 
human iris identification approach (NSTC, 2006) and 
in the same year was the recognition Sok Gek 
solution visual form of objects classified by 
hierarchical syntax extraction in which objects and 
then reduce the binary thin line image and 
distinguish chief Moving from a wide range of where 
moving objects in a family environment. (National 
center, 2005) In 1998, the International Biometric 
Industry Association (IBIA) in Washington, DC was 
founded to advance as a professional association of 
non-profit industry, common global interests of the 
biometric industry. The National Biometric Security 
Project (NBSP) was established in 2001 in response 
to the events of September 11, 2001, and the need to 
accelerate the development and deployment of 
biometric technologies. (National Biometric Security 
Project, 2008) In April 2002 Staff Paper Technology 
palm print and IAFIS skills to palm print 
identification services (IS) Advisory Council 
Subcommittee CJIS policy (PDB) has been submitted. 
The Joint Working Group then moved "for strong 
support for planning, costs and the development of 
an integrated latent print function with the palm of 
the CJIS Division of the FBI. This should be seen as an 
attempt on the same parallel lines passing IAFIS 
developed and integrated into the CJIS technical 
skills "as a result of these and other supporting 
evolving business needs of the prosecution, said the 
initiative Next Generation FBI IAFIS (NGI). An 
essential part of the NCI initiative is the development 
of the needs and the use of an integrated national 
Palm Print service. Show law enforcement 
authorities at least 30 percent of prints lifted the 
knife handles crime scenes, gun grips, steering 
wheels and windows - are palm, not your fingers. For 
this reason, detection and scanning latent palm 
become an area of increasing interest in the 
application of the law. National service Palm Print is 
based on improving the ability of law enforcement to 
provide a complete set of biometric data (George, 
2005) exchange developed. 
3.	Related	works	
The Researchers have been working on systems 
to help protecting the privacy of humans. Many ideas 
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were implemented such as the fingerprint, face, iris 
recognition, and voice; this is a review of some of the 
research that used different methods. (Duca et al., 
1997) propose an algorithm based on Bayes theory 
in order to fuse individual experts opinions. The 
modalities used in their system are face and speech 
for each person involved. Experimental results show 
that fusion improves accuracy over the uni-biometric 
systems by reaching success rates of 99.5%. A multi-
view face and gait recognition system was proposed 
by (Shakhnarovich et al., 2001) using an image-
based visual hull. Image sequences captured from 
multiple cameras are passed to an unmodified face 
or gait recognition algorithm, the proposed 
algorithm shows an integrated face and gait 
recognition provides improved performance over a 
single modality of one of them alone. The researcher 
(Karthik, 2008) in his thesis fusion methodology 
based on the Neyman-Pearson theorem for 
combination of match scores provided by multiple 
biometric matchers, the likelihood ratio (LR) test 
used in the Neyman-Pearson theorem directly 
maximizes the genuine accept rate (GAR) at any 
desired false accept rate (FAR). (Park, 2009) 
proposed video-bases face recognition framework 
using 3D face modeling technique and show how it is 
used to compensate for age variations to improve 
face recognition performance. The aging modeling 
technique adapts view invariant 3D face models to 
the given 2D face aging database, an automatic facial 
mark detection method and a fusion scheme that 
combines the facial mark matching with a 
commercial face recognition matcher to improve the 
recognition performance. In 2010 (Emanuela, 2010) 
proposed a security perspective dependence to 
multimodal biometrics system to be protected 
against number of vulnerable points that may be 
attacked by a hacker who may choose to fake only a 
subset of them to improve the performance of the 
existing integration mechanisms in presence of 
degraded data and their security in presence of spoof 
attacks. (Youmaran, 2011) presented a  face and iris 
images and that can be applied for low quality face 
and iris images recognition in a non-cooperative, the 
proposed algorithms can be used to detect the 
subject’s face, locate the eyes, reduce iris noise, 
segment the iris, generate a template and then 
identify the subject through typical pattern matching 
algorithms. In 2012 (Almayyan, 2012) applied multi 
model biometrics system fusion Online signature 
and iris authentication techniques, which combined 
the feature-level and decision-level fusions, have 
improved the final authentication performance. 
Therefore, she has been proposed hybrid approach 
offers considerable improvements to the accuracy of 
multimodal biometrics. In 2013 (Malkhasyan, 2013) 
examines security problems of biometric based 
authentication. An authentication method is 
suggested, which is based on fingerprints with 
steganographic data protection in all stages of 
functioning. Suggested procedures of fingerprint 
based enrollment and authentication are also 
functionally described. In 2014 (Chin et al., 2014), 
proposed fuse multiple biometric modalities and to 
secure the fused templates using a hybrid template 
protection method by made out of a feature 
transformation technique known as Random Tiling 
and an equal-probable 2N discretization scheme. The 
former enables the revocability of the template and 
the latter converts the feature elements into binary 
representations according to the area under the 
genuine interval curve, in order to offer better 
privacy protection to the template. Many techniques 
have been proposed to keep the security of biometric 
data; one of the suggested techniques was by (Jain 
and Uludag, 2003) with two scenarios of hiding data, 
first one in a cover image not related to the template 
data, other scenario by using the fingerprint image to 
hiding the facial information. (Wang et al., 2010) 
(Pravin and Shubhangi, 2011) use DCT 
transformation method to hiding the iris code and 
the secret information after encrypting in random 
blocks of the coefficients. Another security system 
have been proposed by (Klimis et al., 2011) based on 
DWT transformation method to hides biometric 
signals in video objects over open network. 
4.	Biometric	systems	
The basic steps of any typical authentication 
biometric system comprise four steps Fig. 3: 
4.1.	Data	requirement	
Suitable user interface incorporating the 
biometric sensor or reader is needed to measure or 
record the raw biometric data of the user using any 
device such as (digital camera, sensor, scanner…. 
etc.) is the interface between the real world and the 
system, It in the form of raw biometric data to 
capture data about any part that need to be used to 
recognize the person. Data requirement is very 
important because the quality of raw biometrics 
depends on the characteristics of device which 
capture the images (Claus, 2011).  
4.2.	Feature	extraction	
Usually, the raw biometric data required is 
subjected to pre-processing operations before 
features are extracted from it; the feature extraction 
shown as third block in Fig. 2 refers to extract the 
features. This step is really important to choose 
which features to extract and how to do it. Feature 
extraction refers to the process of generating a 
compact but expressive digital representation of the 
underlying biometric trait, called a template which 
contains the data to glean only the salient 
information from the acquired biometric sample to 
form a new representation of the biometric trait, 
called the feature set. Ideally, the feature set should 
be unique for each person and also invariant with 
respect to changes in the different samples of the 
same biometric trait collected from the same person 
(extremely small intra-user variability). The feature 
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set obtained during enrollment is stored in the 
system database as a template. It performs the 
necessary preprocessing: it has to remove artifacts 
from the data required, and make some process to 
enhance the input (e. g. removing some noise), to use 
some kind of normalization, rotate etc. (Claus, 2011; 
Anil, 2002). 
 
 
Fig.	2: Basic building blocks of a generic biometric system 
4.3.	Matching	module	
This step of a biometric recognition system is to 
compare the extracted feature set with a database of 
known features of the biometric application. 
Generate matching scores, which determines the 
large degree of similarity (dissimilarity) between the 
two features sets (Claus, 2011). Matching represents 
a similarity metrics which determine the accuracy 
performance of the system for a given population of 
identities; hence the election of appropriate 
similarity scheme and representation is critical. 
5.	Properties	of	biometrics		
Biometric systems are widely implemented 
worldwide for boarder control, restricted access of 
privileged information, secured online banking 
systems, and social insurance programs and so on. 
Although, uni-biometric systems (biometric systems 
based on single source of evidence) are widely 
deployed and used, they have several limitations that 
hinder their reliability and make them less reliable in 
identification and authentication applications. Some 
of these limitations are outlined below (Ross et al., 
2006):  
Accuracy: Noisy sensor data, non-universality, 
inter-class similarity and lack of invariant 
representation. 
Scalability: If the number of data samples, N, is 
large, identification becomes an issue. 
Security and Privacy: Spoofing can take place in 
many traits such as fingerprint, signature and voice. 
In response to these limitations, multibiometric 
systems have been recently introduced as an 
improved means for person’s identification and 
recognition purposes. Such systems rely on multiple 
evidence rather than single biometric evidence (Ross 
et al., 2006). By integrating multiple biometric 
samples or multiple traits, more efficient and reliable 
systems can be devised. Information fusion has been 
proposed to achieve the integration of the multiple 
biometric traits at different stages of multibiometric 
systems (Snelick et al., 2005; Ulery et al., 2006). It 
should be noted that the resulting systems can be 
either be hybrid or simple systems depending on the 
type of information fusion strategy being adopted 
and applied. Fig. 3 shows the major differences 
between uni- and multibiometric systems. The 
integration of several biometric samples and/or 
traits is made possible only by the incorporation of 
the information fusion module which highlights the 
importance of the latter module in the successful 
development of multibiometric systems since uni-
modal could be considered in an ensemble but 
without allowing possible an improved matching and 
recognition performance. 
 
 
Fig.	3: Single Biometric vs. Multibiometric System 
 
Multimodal biometric systems can be designed to 
operate in five different modes (Ross et al., 2006):  
5.1.	Multiple‐sensor	mode	
In this mode, the raw biometric data is acquired 
from multiple sensors, processed and integrated to 
generate new data from which features can be 
extracted, Needless to notion the increased 
hardware, software and computational costs caused 
by such integration. However, the incorporation of 
sources from multiple sensors significantly improves 
the segmentation and registration procedures in 
addition to improving the matching accuracy (Ross 
et al., 2006).  
5.2.	 Single‐biometric	 multiple‐representations	
mode	
In these systems, the same biometric data is 
processed using multiple algorithms at the mapping 
and feature levels. For instance, a multiresolution 
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algorithm based on texture analysis and a minutiae-
based algorithm can operate on the same fingerprint 
image in order to extract diverse feature sets that 
would greatly improve the performance of the 
overall system. This mode is characterized by its cost 
efficiency since it does not require the use of 
multiple sensors. Furthermore, the user is not 
required to interact with multiple sensors thereby 
enhancing user convenience and comfort. It does 
require the introduction of new feature extractor 
and/or matcher modules which may increase the 
computational requirements of the system (Ross and 
Jain, 2003). 
5.3.	Single‐biometric	multiple‐units	mode	
Multiple instances of the same biometric trait are 
considered in this mode. For example, the left and 
right irises of the same person are considered for 
fusion and further processing. Systems pertaining to 
this mode generally do not necessitate the 
introduction of new sensors nor do they entail the 
development of new feature extraction and matching 
algorithms and are, therefore, more cost efficient 
than those systems belonging to the previous mode. 
In some cases, a new sensor arrangement might be 
necessary in order to facilitate the simultaneous 
capture of the various units (Ross and Jain, 2003). 
5.4.	Single‐biometric	multiple‐	snapshots	mode	
In this mode, a single sensor is used to capture 
multiple snapshots of the same biometric trait. A 
mosaicking scheme may then be used to assemble 
the multiple impressions and create a composite 
image. One of the main issues in this mode is the 
determination of the number of samples or 
snapshots that have to be acquired from an 
individual. It is important to well capture the 
variability, as well as the typicality, of the 
individual's biometric data in the captured samples 
(Ross et al., 2006). 
5.5.	Multiple‐biometrics	mode	
Multibiometric systems requiring more than one 
modal are classified under this mode. For instance, 
the iris and fingerprint of the same person can be 
used for the matching, identification and recognition 
purposes. Systems belonging to this mode are 
usually known as multimodal biometric systems 
(Group, 2014). Unlike the first four modes where 
multiple sources of information are derived from the 
same biometric trait, in the last mode, useful 
biometric information is derived from different 
biometric traits. However, fusion at the matching 
score level seems to be the logical choice as it is 
relatively easy to access and combine scores 
presented by the different modalities. Furthermore, 
incorporating the fusion process at earlier stages of 
the multibiometric system is more effective. In 
summary, the main advantages of multibiometric 
systems are outlined below (Ross et al., 2006):  
* Improve accuracy. * Address the issue of non-
universality problem. * Provide flexibility to the user. 
* Reduce the effect of noisy data. * Provide the 
capability to search a large database in 
computationally efficient manner. * Resistant to 
spoof attacks. * Fault tolerant systems. 
Each of the above-mentioned features mitigates 
one or some of the limitations found in uni-biometric 
systems. Table 1, gives a comparative summary of 
the various biometric traits with respect to key 
factors such as universality, performance, 
acceptability and distinctiveness.  
 
Table	1: Comparison of various biometric technologies 
(H=High, M=Medium, L=Low) 
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Face H L H H L H L
Fingerprint H H H M H M H
Hand Geometry M M M H M M M
Keystroke L L L M L M M
Hand Vein M M M M M M H
Iris H H H M H L H
Retinal scan H H M L H L H
Signature L L L H L H L
Voice M L L M L H L
DNA H H H L H L L
Gait M L L H L H M
Ear M M H M M H M
   
6.	Template	protection	technologies	
Biometric Template Protection Schemes are 
classified into Feature	Transformation	and Biometric	
Encryption. Jain et al in (Jain et al., 2006) categorized 
the various biometric template protection 
techniques as: 
6.1.	Feature	transformation	
In Feature Transformation, a biometric template 
(BT)	 is transformed to F	 (BT,	 X)	 after a function F	
with a randomly generated key X	 is applied to it. 
Feature Transformation is further categorized into 
either invertible	 or non‐invertible	 transform. In 
invertible	transform, the key X	can be used to recover 
the original biometric template (BT)	 while in 
noninvertible	 transform the key X	 is a one-way key 
that makes it hard to recover the original biometric 
template (BT)	 even if the key X	 is known as was 
pointed out by (Radha and Karthikeyan, 2010). 
Existing literature identify bio‐hashing	 as an 
invertible transformation and cancellable	biometrics	
as noninvertible transformation (Rathgeb and Uhl, 
2011). 
6.1.1.	Cancellable	biometrics	
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Unlike passwords, PINs and access codes, 
biometric templates can never be replaced with 
newer ones if they are compromised. To circumvent 
this challenge, cancellable biometrics were 
introduced such that biometric templates could be 
cancelled and replaced (Radha and Karthikeyan, 
2011). Cancellable biometrics scheme is an 
intentional and systematic repeatable distortion of 
biometric template data with the purpose of 
protecting it under transformational-based 
biometric template security (Rathgeb and Uhl, 
2011).  
6.1.2.	Bio‐hashing	
Biohashing	 is a biometric template protection 
approach in which features from a biometric 
template are transformed using a transformation 
function defined by a password or a key known only 
to the user (Schmitt and Jordaan, 2013). This key or 
password needs to be securely stored and 
remembered by the user for subsequent 
authentication.  
6.2.	Biometric	cryptosystems	
In an earlier research, Jain et al in (Jain et al., 
2006) subdivided biometric cryptosystems into Key	
Generation	and Key	Binding.	
6.2.1.	Key	Generation	
In Key Generation a biometric key is derived 
directly from biometric data (Blanton & Aliasgari, 
2013). Under Key Generation we discuss secure 
sketches and fuzzy extractors. 
4.2.1.1.	Secure	sketches	and	fuzzy	extractors	
Dodis et al. originated with secure	 sketches	 and 
fuzzy	 extractors	 in a preliminary version of their 
research work in year 2004 which was later 
published in (Dodis et al., 2008). They defined Fuzzy	
Extractor	and Secure	Sketch	as follows; 
i. Fuzzy	 Extractor: reliably extracts almost 
uniform randomness R	 from its input: The 
significance of fuzzy extraction is that it is error-
tolerant in the sense that R	 will not change even if 
the input changes e.g. if another biometric template 
from the same finger is used, as long as it is almost 
similar to the original R	implying R	can be used in a 
cryptographic application as a key. 
ii. Secure	 Sketch: produced public information 
about its input w	 that did not reveal w	 and yet 
allowed exact recovery of w	given another value that 
is close to w	 which was an advantage that made it 
possible for it to be reliably used to reproduce error 
prone biometric inputs without incurring security 
risks inherent in storing them.  
6.2.2.	Key	binding	
It is where a secret key and the biometric 
template are monolithically bound within a 
cryptographic framework whilst it is 
computationally infeasible to decode the key or 
biometric template without prior knowledge of the 
user‟s biometric data (Schmitt and Jordaan, 2013).  
6.2.2.1.	Fuzzy	vault	
It is where secret information is encrypted and 
decrypted securely using a fuzzy unordered set of 
genuine points and haff points (Juels and Sudan, 
2002). The limitations of a fuzzy vault scheme as 
listed by Hooda & Gupta in (Hooda and Gupta, 2013) 
are; i. Difficulty in revoking a compromised vault 
which is also prone to cross-matching of biometric 
templates across databases. ii. Easy for an attacker to 
stage attacks after statistically analyzing points in 
vault. iii. It is possible for an attacker to substitute 
his biometric features with that of the targeted 
biometric features thus beating vault authentication. 
iv. The other threat is that, if the original template of 
the genuine user is temporarily exposed, the attacker 
can glean the template during this exposure. 
4.2.2.2.	Fuzzy	commitment	
It is a biometric cryptosystem which is used to 
secure biometrics traits represented in binary vector 
(Jeny and Jangid, 2013). Jeny & Jangid added that, a 
fuzzy commitment scheme is one where a uniformly 
random key of length 1 bits is generated and used to 
exclusively index an nbit	codeword of suitable error 
correcting code where the sketch extracted from the 
biometric template is stored in a database. The 
difference between fuzzy	 vault	 and fuzzy	
commitment	 as brought out by Geethanjali et al. is 
that biometric traits secured by fuzzy commitment 
are represented in the form of binary vectors which 
are divided into a number of segments and each 
segment is separately secured while biometric traits 
in fuzzy vault are represented in the form of point 
set which are secured by hiding them with chaff 
points (Geethanjali et al., 2012).  
6.3.	Other	biometric	template	protection		
Schemes:	 watermarking scheme, RSA and ECC 
algorithms. 
6.3.1.	Watermarking	
In a biometric watermarking scheme, if an 
attacker tries to replace or forge the biometric 
template then he must have the knowledge of pixel 
values where watermark information is hidden as 
shown by (Malhotra and Kant, 2013).  
6.3.2.	 Rivest,	 Shamir	 and	 Adleman	 (RSA)	
technique	
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RSA is an encryption algorithm for public key 
cryptography based on the practical difficulty 
problem of factorization of large integers as was 
described by (Nasir and Kuppuswamy, 2013). RSA 
algorithm‟s debut was in 1978 when it was first 
introduced by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman and was 
named after their names i.e. Rivest, Shamir and 
Adleman. The implementation of RSA algorithm 
involves a public key and a private key where the 
public key can be known to everyone and used for 
encrypting messages.  
6.3.3.	Elliptic	Crypto	Curve	(ECC)	Technique	
Muthukuru & Sathyanarayana described an 
Elliptic Curve Cryptography also known as ECC as a 
public key cryptography that makes use of algebraic 
forms of elliptic curves over elements restricted to 
finite fields (Muthukuru and Sathyanarayana, 2013).  
7.	Summary	and	conclusions	
Most of biometric systems used in real 
applications are unimodal, which means they rely on 
only one area of identification. So, they are not 
reliable enough like the systems that use more than 
one attributes ,such as collecting voice and face or 
palmprint for two hands to the same person, this 
system known" multibiometrics system". 
Multibiometrics systems are fusing separate 
information or separate features to provide integrate 
information. That make the systems more reliable 
recognition of individuals, also if don’t enable to 
obtains for required data to any traits the other 
traits enough led the system more is become more 
especially when used more than two traits reliable. 
The problems associated with biometrics are less 
obvious. Thinking about security and privacy, if a 
biometric is stolen, it cannot be regenerated like a 
password or PIN – it is compromised for the 
duration of the owner's life. Further, if biometric 
data is used in an unprotected setting, such as the 
Internet, the chance of compromise is high. We must 
remember that the Internet is composed of more 
than just unsecured transport channels - databases 
and other storage servers store biometric data. The 
prevalence of biometrics also means that common 
biometric data is stored in several locations for 
different purposes - allowing a searcher to link a 
particular user across disjoint databases and 
applications. 
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